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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CONCERNED PARENTS OF STEPCHILDREN, on behalf of their
members and all others similarly situated, and JANICE
EVERILL, ELLEN LEI-H\TALDER and
LINDA REY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Case No. 16870
v.
ANTHONY MITCHELL, individually:
and in his capacity as Execu- :
tive Director of the Utah
Department of Social Services,:
and KEITH ORAM, individually
and in his capacity as Director of the Office of Assist-:
ance Payments Administration,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable James
S. Sawaya

~residing.

Based on Stipulated facts, the District

Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and held that
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Defendants had not violated state or federal statutes or
regulations in terminating part of the state's welfare
program.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the decision of the
District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is
a state administered welfare program authorized under the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §601 et seq.) and funded by
both state and federal governments which provides public
assistance to families with children who are
parental support."

11

deprived of

Federal regulations require this depri-

vation be determined only in relation to a child's natural
or adoptive parent unless state law imposes an identical
support requirement on stepparents.

The State of Utah has

paid benefits to Appellants Everill, Lehwalder, and Rey but
stopped these payments in May, 1979.

This termination was

based on Respondents' policy change, implemented in May,
1979, which eliminated all families with stepparents from
Utah's AFDC program.
to S.B. 54

This change was implemented in response

(1979), R 96-98, and deletion of funds for this

portion of the AFDC p:i;-ogram by the ·19 79 Utah Legislature.
Appellants were notified of the termination of assistance by
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a notice sent May 10, 1979, R. 102.

Respondents implemented

this policy change by promulgating an emergency rule adoption
pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rule-Making Act, U.C.A.
§63-46-1 et seq., R. 103.

The United States Department of

Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has disapproved of the
policy change.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
S.B. 54 IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND CANNOT BE USED TO TERMINATE WELFARE
BENEFITS.
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program is a joint federal-state welfare program.

Under the

AFDC program, Utah receives federal matching funds for cash
assistance provided to needy dependent children and the
relatives who are caring for them.

In return for the

federal matching funds Utah must comply with federal conditions attached to the receipt of those funds.
The general issue in this case is whether or not
Plaintiffs' children qualify as "dependent children" as
defined in the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. §606, and the HEW
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regulations, 45 C.F.R. §233.90.
42

u.s.c.

If so, Utah is required by

§602(a) (10) and the Supremacy Clause to provide

them with AFDC benefits.
A participating state may not deny aid to persons
who

~ome

within the federal standard of eligibility established

by those regulations, Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725

(1978),

King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), Nolan v. deBaca,
603 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1979).

State courts have also

recognized this principle, see Willard v. State, Dept. of
Soc. and Health Services, 592 P.2d 1103 (Wash. 1979) and
McLemore v. Welfare Division of Dept. of Hum. Res., 551
P.2d 1101 (Nev. 1976).

The question then becomes whether

children in Utah living in homes with a stepparent are
eligible for AFDC benefits under the federal standards.
There are two basic elements to the definition of
a "dependent child."

First a child must be needy; that is,

the child's income must be less than Utah has determined is
necessary for the child's needs.

~efendant

can not challenge

the fact that Plaintiffs' children are needy.

All were

receiving AFDC prior to the events at issue in this case and
their benefits were not terminated because of a determination
that they were no longer needy.
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The second element is that a child must be "deprived
of parental support or care" by reason of a parent's death,
continued absence, or physical or mental incapacity, 42

u.s;c.

§606, or unemployment, 42

u.s.c.

§607.

Under the

statute and the HEW regulations, a child meets this requirement when there is only one "parent 11 in the home or when
there are two

11

par en ts

11

in the home and one or both are ·

incapacitated or unemployed.

45 C.F.R. §233.90(a),

(c) (1) (i).

The HEW regulations defihe which persons a state
may treat as a "parent" in deter:rnining whether this
requirement is met.

11

deprivation"

They provide that a "parent 11 means a

natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a stepparent who
... is ceremonially married to the child's
natural or adoptive parent and is legally
obligated to support the child under State
law of general applicability which reauires stepparents to support stepchildren
to the same extent that natural or adoptive
parents are required to support their
children.
Under this requirement, the
inclusion in the family, or the presence
in the home, of a "substitute parent" or
"man-in-the-house" or any individual other
than one described in this paragraph is
not an acceptable basis for a finding of
ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the State; nor may the
State agency prorate or otherwise reduce
the money amount for any need item included
in the standard on the basis of assumed
contributions from nonlegally responsible
individuals living in the household.
In
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establishing financial eligibility and
the amount of the assistance payment, only
such net income as is actually available for
current use on a regular basis will be considered, and the income only of the parent
described in the first sentence of this
paragraph will be considered available for
children in the household in the absence
of proof of actual contributions.
45 C.F.R. §233.90 (a).
(emphasis added)
The Appellants' children in this case are children
who are living with one natural parent and a stepparent.

It

is conceded by Respondents that at least until May, 1979
stepparents in Utah could not be treated as parents under
the HEW regulations.

The children therefore met the depri-

vation requirement because there was only one "parent"
living with them.
Respondents terminated the children's benefits on
May 31, 1979 on the basis that as a result of a change in
state law stepparents in Utah may now be treated as "parents"
under these regulations.
Appellants show below that stepparents in Utah may
not be treated as "parents" under the HEW regulations and
that even if they may be, that the children may still meet
the "deprivation" requirement on the basis that one of their
"parents" is incapacitated or unemployed.
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HEW has interpreted the above regulation and
utilized what has become known as the "tri-partite test" to
evaluate State laws to determine whether they meet the
"general applicability" and '!co-extensiveness" tests of the
r~gulations.

This test was originally set out in the HEW

Amicus Curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Lewis v.
Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
to the present day.

HEW has continued this analysis

See letter to Defendant Mitchell from

Patricia J. Livers, Acting HEW Regional Commissioner dated
June 8, 1979.

Appendix 1.

This test requires that the

stepparent support obligation be
1.

a duty of general applicability;

2.

one in which he could be compelled by
court order to fulfill even after he
has deserted or abandoned the household; and

3.

one which must exist regardless of
whether the children would otherwise
receive AFDC payments.

If the state statute does not meet all of these three
requirements, the stepparent cannot be considered a "parent"
for purposes of determining the child's "deprivation."
It is crucial to note that this test is not a test
of constitutionality.

A statute which is constitutional

still may not comply with the HEW regulations.

The effect,

of course, is that stepparents cannot be considered "parents"
for purposes of welfare determinations.

As one court stated:
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[T]here is no need to generally declare
Public Law No. 93 invalid.
However, to
the extent Public Law No. 93 and Public
Law No. 275 are inconsistent with federal
regulations, they may not be used as the
vehicle to terminate or reduce AFDC payments so long as the State of Indiana shall
participate in the AFDC program under the
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C.
§601 et seq, as Indiana has statutorily
agreea-to do . . . . Gaither v. Sterrett, 346
F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd.
409 U.S. 1070 (1972).
Numerous state and federal courts have applied
this three-part test and in all cases but two have found
state law insufficient to meet the HEW regulations.

~he

first and third parts of the test above require the law to
be one of

11

general applicability" and not limited to receipt

of welfare.

This provision has been relied on to invalidate

action taken by several states to terminate welfare payments
to families with stepparents.

This language has generally

been interpreted to mean that statutes requiring stepparents to support their stepchildren only

when they would

otherwise become "publj,.c wards" or eligible for welfare are
invalid under 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a).
supra.

Gaither v. Sterrett,

Application of Slochowsky, 73 Misc. 2d 563, 342

N.Y.S. 2d 525
502 P.2d 607

(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Bunting v. Juras,
(Ore. Ct. App. 1972).
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The second aspect of the HEW test requires that
the stepparent's liability be enforceable by court order
after abandonment or desertion until a divorce takes place.
This test has been referred to as a test of

~coextensive

ness", requiring the stepparent be liable to the same extent
as is a natural or adoptive parent for the support of a
child.

The court in Gaither v. Sterrett, found the Indiana

statute defective in this area, since it required only
stepfathers (not stepmothers) to support their stepchildren
while residing with them (not after a separation) .

In

comparing the support obligations of stepfathers under this
statute with that imposed by law on natural and adoptive
parents, the court found the statute inconsistent with the
federal regulations.

346 F. Supp. at 1101.

S.B. 54 fails to meet this three-pronged test.
The first and clearest difference between the support obligation of stepparents and that of natural parents is in duration.
A stepparent may terminate the obligation by simply separating
from his or her spouse and filing for divorce.

U.C.A. §78-45-4.1.

This is directly contrary to the provisions for temporary
support embodied in U.C.A. §30-4-1 et seq.
The second difference is in the nature of the
liability.

Stepparents may sue to recover their support

payments, U.C.A. §78-45-4.2, while natural and adoptive
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parents have no such surety to fall back on.

~gain,

a clear

difference in support obligations between stepparents and
natural or adoptive parents.
Third, S.B. 54 provides that a stepparent shall
support a stepchild and defines child in this context as

11

son or daughter under the age of 18 years".

It

Section 1.

a

seems clear that the support obligation ends when the stepchild reaches 18.

This however is not true for natural or

adoptive parents who may be liable for the support of their
children until age 21, if ordered by a court in
action.

U.C.A. §15-2-1 (as amended 1975).

a

divorce

Since the divorce

statute provides no basis for assessing support for stepchildren and S.B. 54 specifically excludes stepparent support
obligations after a separation connected with a divorce, the
same problem which arose in Oregon in the Sunting case,
supra, presents itself to this Court: the law under consideration is simply not a law of "general applicability."

The

fact that students in Utah who are between 18 and 21 can
receive welfare yet are not entitled to support from their
stepparents in Utah, as in Oregon, is a further indicator
that S.B. 54 is not a law of general applicability.
Fourth, the declaration that "the support obligation shall be as if the marriage had never taken place

11

appears to conflict with the support obligation that may be
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imposed in the annulment context, U.C.A. §30-1-17.2, where
the court may order temporary or permanent support and
maintenance as it determines is equitable.
Finally, it appears that a possible interpretation
of, U.C.A. §78-45-4.1 would allow a stepparent to avoid
liability for support due and owing from a period of separation prior to filing for a divorce or a legal separation.
This three-part test and the underlying analysis
should be given great weight by this court.

In Lewis v.

Martin, the source of the test, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the court would "give HEW the deference due the
agency charged with the administration of the [Social
Security] Act."

397 U.S. at 559.

In fact the Suoreme Court

has even gone further in its deference to the appropriate
administrative agency, stating in New York State Dept. of
Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973) that
"the construction of a statute by those charged with its
execution should be followed unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong ... "

This deferral to the

expertise of the agency may be even greater in interpreting
its own regulations.
799, 802

See Bourgeois v. Stevens, 532 F.2d

(1st Cir. 1976).

Utah has adopted a similar rule.

McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726
(1963); Lockheed J\.. ircraft Corp. v. State Tax Comm.,

-11-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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566 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 1977).

In the present case the

agency interpretation of the Social Security Act and its own
rules coincides with the arguments of Appellants and should
be adopted by this court.
This agency interpretation is found in the June 8,
1979 and August 3, 1979 letters to ?.espondent Mitchell from
Acting HEW Regional Commissioner Patricia Livers, attached
as Appendices 1 and 2.

In those letters, REW states why the

Respondents have violated applicable federal regulations and
the "tripartite test" of Lewis v . .Martin.
In fact, Respondents concede that the terms of
U.C.A. §78-45-4.1 did not meet the requirements of 45 C.f.R.
233.90(a).

This section was recently amended by the 1980

Utah Legislature to remove the language which restricted
stepparent support liability.

This amendment to the statute,

urged by Respondents on the Legislature as necessary to
avoid a cut-off in federal funding for welfare programs,
points up even further the deficiencies in the law prior to
its amendment.

See Appendix 3 for text of 1980 changes.

The issues raised in this appeal are certainly

~ot

moot,

however, since over 1800 families continue to be deprived of
welfare assistance as a result of S.B. 54.
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Respondents argue that Archibald v. Whaland,
555 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1977) is helpful in analyzing the
present case.

That case is one of only two cases ever

decided that upheld a state procedure as consistent with the
requirements of 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a).

That case presented a

rather different issue for the court:

whether exclusion of

stepchildren from the New Hampshire criminal non-support
statutes violated the "coextensiveness'' test.

The court

held that this difference was de minimus and that the test
was otherwise satisfied.

Of critical significance in that

case as well is the court's reliance on the HEW regional
office analysis of the New Hampshire statute, finding it to
be compatible with federal regulations.

By contrast, as

illustrated above, the HEW regional office covering Utah has
not only not approved the state law but has initiated
sanctions against the state for the actions giving rise to
this case.

This Court should adopt the HEW analysis, find

S.B. 54 incompatible with federal regulations and hold, as
did the Gaither court, that this statute "may not be used as
the vehicle to terminate or reduce AFDC payments".
POINT II
RESPONDENTS' NOTICE OF MAY 10, 1979,
VIOLATED 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4)
IN THAT IT FAILED TO PROVIDE APPELLANTS WITH ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE
PROPOSED ELIMINATION OF BENEFITS.
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1.

Controlling Federal Regulations
Require Respondents to Provide
AFDC Recipients with Timely and
Adequate Notice of Proposed Elimination of Benefits.

If states choose to participate in the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, they must
do so in compliance with the provisions of Title IV of the
Social Security Act and with valid regulations issued by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare governing the
program.

King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,

(1968).

45 C.F.R.

§205.lO(a) provides in pertinent parts:
A State plan under Titles I, IV-A, X,
XIV, XVI, or XIX of the Social Security
Act shall provide a system of hearings
under which:
(4)
In cases of intended action to discontinue, terminate, suspend or reduce
assistance;
(i)
The state or local agency shall give
timely and adequate notice .... (emphasis
added)
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) (iii) defines the reauirernents of adequate notice when changes in either state or
Federal law require automatic grant adjustments for classes
or recipients.
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When changes in either state or Federal law
require automatic grant adjustments for
classes of recipients, timelv notice of
such grant adju~tments shall~be given which
shall be adequate if it includes (1) a
statement of the intended action, (2) the
reasons for such intended action, (3) a
statement of the specific change in law
requiring such action, and (4) a statement of the circumstances under which a
hearing may be obtained and assistance
continued.
(emphasis added)
Federal regulations thus require Respondents to
give

ti~ely

and adequate notice to Appellants of the elimina-

tion of the AFDC benefits.
2.

Respondents' Notice of Intended Action
Dated May 10, 1979 was Inadequate As
It Failed to Include A Statement of
the Specific Change in Law Requiring
the Action.

45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) (iii) provides that notice
of automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients
pursuant to a change in state law "shall be adepuate if it
includes ... a statement of the specific change in law requiring such action."

Res?ondents' notice to l'.FDC recirients

with stepfathers i.n the home dated May 10, 1979, failed to
include such a statement.

The notice merely refers to "a

change in the Utah law" and gives no specifics at all.

'I'he
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absence of a statement of the specific change in Utah law
requiring elimination of AFDC benefits renders the notice
inadequate under federal law and in and of itself precludes
termination of benefits until proper notice is given.
In Becker v. Blum, 464 F. Supp. 152, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), the court held that a notice to medicaid beneficiaries
of a requirement of co-Dayment for the purchase of prescription drugs was inadequate because among other things the
notice did not contain a specific statement of the change of
law requiring the action.

That notice had four full para-

graphs explaining the change in the law in comparison to the
nearly nonexistent explanation in the present case.
was still inadequate.

Yet, it

The court in Curtis v. Page, No. 78-

732 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 1978) reached a similar result
holding the notice defective on the ground there is no
specific statement of the change in law.

A copy of this

case is attached hereto as Appendix 4.
3.

Respondents' Notice of Intended Action
Dated May 10, 1979 was Inadequate Since
it Failed to Include a Statement of the
Circumstances Under Which a Eearing
Could be Obtained and Assistance Continued.

-16-
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45 C~F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) (iii) provides that notice
of automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients
pursuant to a change in state law "shall be adequate if it
includes ... a statement of the circumstances under which a
hearing may be obtained and assistance continued."

De-

fendants' notice dated May 10, 1979 failed to include such a
statement.

The absence of such a statement renders the

notice inadequate under federal law.
Adequate notice is required to give recipients the
opportunity to exercise their right to a hearing and to a
continuation of benefits pending that hearing.

~hese

rights

are set out in 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (5) and (6):
(5)
An opportunity for a hearing shall be
granted to ... any recipient who is aggrieved
by any agency action resulting in suspension,
reduction, discontinuance or termination of
assistance. A hearing need not be granted
with either State or Federal law requires
automatic grant adjustments for classes of
reciuients unless the reason for an individu~l aopeal is an incorrect grant computation.
(emphasis added)
(v)
The agency may deny or dismiss a request for a hearing where the sole issue
is one of state or Federal law requiring
automatic grant adjustments for classes of
recipients.
Yet, if a recipient requests a hearing in a timely
fashion,

45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (6) provides that:
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Assistance shall not be suspended, reduced,
discontinued or terminated, (but is subject to recovery by the agency if its action
is sustained), until a decision is rendered
after a hearing, unless:
(a)
a determination is made at the hearing
that the sole issue is one of State or
Federal law or policy, or change in state
or Federal law and not of incorrect grant
computation .... §205.10 (a) (6) (A).
(emphasis
added)
The phrase "incorrect grant computation" has been
construed hy federal courts to apply to those instances in
which a recipient challenges the application of the new law
to his or her individual situation.
450 F. Supp.

546,

553

Budnicki v. Beal,

(E.D. Pa. 1978).

Courts have construed the applicable federal
regulations to require a notice to recipients of reductions
of assistance and a statement of the circumstances under
which a hearing can be obtained even if a state law required
automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients.

See

e.g. Curtis, supra at 2-3.
In Budnicki, supra, the court held that a notice
published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin was inadequate which
informed recipients of the reduction in the availability of
orthopedic shoes and shoe accessories under the medical
assistance programs.

The court determined that the re-

duction involved an automatic grant adjustment, yet the
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recipients were entitled to notice of the availability of a
pre-reduction hearing under §205.lO(a) (5) since there was a
possibility, the court speculated, the elimination of the
orthopedic shoe program would not apply to a number of them
because of the individual factual questions involved.

Since

the court found that the state violated federal regulations
in the method of terminating the orthopedic shoe program,
the court reinstated the program.

450 F. Supp. at 557.

In Becker, supra, the state provided notice to
Medicaid recipients of the implementation of a $.50 copayment charge per prescription drug.

The notice failed to

include a statement of the circumstances under which a
hearing could be obtained and assistance continued if a
timely request for a hearing were made.

The court found the

notice to be inadequate and rejected the state's claim that
the notice was harmless because it would have no effect on
the ultimate resolution of the action.
Defendants maintain that regardless of
Plaintiffs' right to notice under the
regulations, the mailing of timely and
adeauate notice would have had no
eff~ct on the ultimate resolution of the
action.
This argument fails to take into
consideration the fact that under certain
circumstances Plaintiff would be entitled
under federal regulations to a pre-termination hearing.
Thus 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (5)

-19-
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requires an opportunity for a hearing to
any applicant "who is aggrieved by any
agency action resulting in suspension,
reduction, discontinuance or termination
of assistance." Although that regulation
further provides that "[a] hearing need not
be granted when either State or Federal
law require automatic grant adjustments
for classes of recipients," there is an
exception to this provision where "the
reason for an individual appeal is incorrect grant computation." Moreover, at
a minimum, Plaintiffs have the right to
have aid continued (subject to recovery)
pending a determination at a hearing that
the sole issue is one of state or Federal
law or policy and not one of incorrect
grant computation.
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a)
(6) (i) (A).
See Viverito v. Smith, 421 F.
Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Turner v. Walsh, 435 F. Supp. 707
524 F.2d 456

(W.D. Mo. aff 'd

(8th Cir. 1978), concerned the validity of a

notice of reduction of welfare assistance.

After enactment

of a statute requiring a new method of determining AFDC
benefits, the state sent notices to recipients that their
AFDC grants would be reduced.

The notice attempted to

inform the recipients that a hearing could be obtained:
If you feel that this decision is not
correct, you have 90 days from the date
of this notice to request a hearing at
your county Division of Family Services
office. Any change in the amount of your
ADC grant or Social Security may effect
[sic] your eligibility for food stamps.
Id. at 713.

-20-
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The court reviewed the Federal regulations and concluded:
Thus, the regulations clearly contemplate
that if a recipient requests a hearing
within ten days of the notice, his/her
benefits will continue at their present
level until a decision is rendered after
the hearing, unless at the time of the
hearing, a determination is made that
the only issue involved is one of state
or federal law or policy.
In that event,
the benefits, having continued from the
date of the notice, would terminate as of
the date of the hearing.
In no event-given a hearing request within 10 days
of notice raising an alleged error in
grant computation--do the regulations
contemplate termination of benefits orior
to the hearing.
Id. at 714.
The court held that the "notice clearly is deficient."
Unquestionably, this notice contains no
mention of the circumstances under which
assistance may be continued, and inadequately describes the circumstances under
which a hearing may be obtained. No mention
is made of the ten-day "timely notice
period." 45 C.F.R. §205.10 (a) (1) (A). r·"Jo
statement if made concerning the fact that
under certain circumstances, benefits may
be continued until the hearing, and that
unless a determination is made at the hearing
that the sole issue is one of state or
Federal law or policy, or change in State
or Federal law and not one of incorrect
grant computation, the benefits continue
pending a determination following the
hearing.
Id. at 713-14.
The court rejected any contention that the recipients were not entitled to notice of the right to a
hearing and to continued benefits pending that hearing
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because the only issue involved was one of state or federal
law.

That determination could only be made at the time of

the hearing.
Thus, as Plaintiffs argue, the Courts have
recognized that even in across-the-board.
adjustments necessitated by a change in
law, some mistakes are inevitable, and the
obvious and irreparable injury which occurs
when there is an erroneous termination or
reduction can only be prevented where, as
contemplated by the regulations herein,
the State is required " ... to pay aid pending
in all cases where timely appeals are filed"
from a proper notice.
Yee-Lit v. Richardson.
353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal. 1973) at 999.
The precautions necessary in this sensitive
area are not unlike those which form the
basis of our system of criminal justice
in this country:
our Constitution and laws
provide safeguards in pursuit of which we
willingly acquit an occasional guilty man
in order that we not unwillingly convict
a single innocent man.
Id. at 716.
Thus, the regulations envision the following fair
hearing procedure where across-the-board cutbacks are proposed:

(1) the provision of ~dequate notice to recipients;

(2) the recipient requests a hearing;

(3)

the recipient's

benefits are continued at the same level until the hearing;
(4) at the hearing, the hearing officer determines whether
the sole issue is one of state law or policy;

(5) if so, the

recipient's benefits are reduced and the hearing request is
dismissed;

(6) if a question of fact exists, the hearing
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proceeds and benefits are continued until the hearing
officer's decision is rendered.
This system of postponing any fact/policy determination until the time of hearing, and of continuing
benefits at the same level until that hearing, is necessary
to insure the fairness of that determination.
Burlingame v. Schmidt, 368 F. Supp. 429, 434

As stated in
(E.D. Wis.

1973):

A pre-hearing determination of discontinuance which is based on the
application of a fact-policy distinction is open to abuses, the
potential for which is not present at
the hearing or post-hearing stage.
Much of the .Plaintiffs' concern lies
with the plight of the unsophisticated
recipient who, at the pre-hearing stage,
is burdened with the task of artfully
pleading a "fact" as opposed to a "policy"
appeal under a system like the one which
was found to be objectionable in Yee-Litt,
wherein a pre-hearing determination is
made concerning the continuation of aid
on the basis of a fact-policy distinction.
However, once the appellant has received
his hearing and voiced his objections to
a proposed cut on whatever grounds available, the situation is changed, and the
fact-policy distinction becomes viable,
as in the scheme provided in the HEW
regulations at 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a).
By requiring that aid be continued in
all cases, at least until the hearing is
held, these HEW regulations have successfully abandoned the fact-policy distinction in that context in which it was
found to be objectionable by the court
in Yee-Litt, and yet preserved it at the
hearing itself, where it is a workable
standard.
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Based on S.B. 54

(1979), Respondents eliminated

what they call the AFDC - Stepchildren (AFDC-SC) program.
In reality there is only one AFDC program.

The purpose of

this program is to give assistance to children who are
deprived of parental support.

In certain cases when both

parents are in the home, children still may be eligible for
AFDC benefits if either parent is unemployed or incapacitated.

Therefore, children could be eligible for AFDC

benefits in certain cases even if a stepparent is in the
home.
Respondents' notice of May 10, 1979, R. 102,
states: "A fair hearing request will not be granted unless
you feel the reason for the closure action was for other
than the change in state law.''

The notice contained no

statement of the conditions under which a hearing could be
requested.

Respondents may deny a request for a hearing

only if some sort of initial hearing is held at which it is
determined that the sole issue is one of state or federal
policy.

However, the state may not deny the recipient the

opportunity for

~

hearing.

Respondents should have informed

recipients of the circumstances under which a hearing could
be obtained and that recipients were entitled to continued
assistance until the time of the hearina.
~

-24Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondents were still obligated to adequately
inform recipients of the right to a hearing even though an
automatic grant adjustment was involved.

Under the change

in the state law, approximately 1850 families involving 3700
children have lost AFDC benefits.

It is likely that many of

those are wrongfully being denied assistance.

Children may

still be eligible for AFDC benefits if their stepfather is
dead, incapacitated, unemployed, or has divorced their
mother or left the home.

Since it is likely that even under

the new law many families will continue to be eligible for
assistance the recipients were wrongfully denied the opportunity for a hearing to challenge the withdrawal of their
benefits and present evidence that they still qualified for
AFDC assistance.

Respondents have denied them a right to a

hearing by not informing them of this right as required by
federal law.
Two recent cases clarify this point.

In Stenson

v. Blum, 476 F. Supp. 1331, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), Plaintiffs
sued to prevent termination of Medicaid benefits without
proper notice and an opportunity for a hearing to show
continued eligibility on other grounds.

The court held:

New York State is hereby enjoined to restore
Medicaid benefits to Stenson and members of
her class until such time as New York State
determines whether the individual class
members remain eligible for Medicaid on a
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ground other than categorical eligibility,
until such individuals receive timely and
adequate notice of the proposed termination
of their Medicaid benefits, and until they
are accorded the opportunity for a hearing.
In the present context, this Court should likewise order
benefits restored until a determination can be made individually that each claimant is no longer eligible for AFDC
assistance.
In a very recent case decided by the U.S. District
Court for Utah, Respondent Mitchell and others were ordered
to adequately notify Medicaid recipients of intended reductions in services and their right to request a hearing in
connection with such reductions and to reimburse Plaintiffs
for money expended on services which had

be~n

reduced or

terminated, since the initial notice of the change in services
was inadequate.

The Court approved a detailed notice state-

rnent to be sent to all recipients of Medicaid which explained
in detail the change in the law which produced the service
cutbacks, the specific services changed and a full explanation of hearing rights and how to request a hearing.
v. Mitchell,

Campos

(D. Utah, March 10, 1980) Attached as P'"ppendix

5.
Again, the inadequate notice in the present case
must be

re~edied

by a new and adequate notice and benefits

-26-
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should be restored to all former recipients until appropriate procedures are developed and utilized to implement
any changes in the AFDC program.
In conclusion, Respondents' notice is inadeauate
because it failed to include a statement of the specific
change in law

re~uiring

the termination of benefits, and it

failed to include a statement of the circumstances under
which a hearing could be obtained and assistance continued.
POINT III
RESPONDENTS'

"NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION"

DELETING THE AFDC-STEPCHILDREN'S
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM VIOLATED THE UTAH
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING ACT.
Administrative agencies in Utah must adopt rules
according to the provisions of the Administrative Rulemaking Act as contained in UCA §63-46-1, et seq.

§63-46-5

provides in part:
Prior to the adoption, amendment, or
repeal of any rule, the agency shall:
(a) Give notice of its intended action.
This notice shall include a statement of
either the terms or substance of the intended action or a description of the
subjects and issues involved, the reasons
for the proposed rule, and the time when,
the place where, and the manner in which
interested persons may present their
views regarding it.
The notice ... shall
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be published in the bulletin to be published by the state archivist ... Except
as provided in subsections (2), (3), and
(4) of this section, no action shall be
taken by the agency until at least twenty
days have elapsed following such mailing
and publication of this notice.
On April 13, 1979, Respondents filed a "Notice of
Agency Action" with the State Archivist indicating an
"Emergency Adoption" of a rule deleting the Stepchild
Assistance Program.

R. 103.

~his notice was published in

the Utah Bulletin on May 1, 1979 and the deletion of the
Stepchild Assistance Program was to take effect on May 8,
1979, only seven days later.
An emergency adoption of an agency rule must
comply with the provisions of UCA §63-46-5(2).

This section

provides:
If an agency finds that an imminent peril
to the public health, safety, or welfare
requires adoption of a rule without providing the notice required by subsection
(1) of this section and states in writinq
its reasons for that finding, it may pro:
ceed without prior notice of hearing, or
upon any abbreviated notice and hearing
that it finds practicable, to adopt an
emergency rule.
The rule mav be effective
for a period of not longer than 120 days,
but the adoption of an identical rule
under subsection (1) of this section is
not precluded.
(emphasis added).
There was no imminent peril to the public health,
safety, or welfare which required an emergency deletion of
the Stepchild Assistance Program.

This program provides

AFDC benefits to needy children with a stepfather in the
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home.

The program could not possibly pose an imminent peril

to the public well-being.

Particularly since the welfare of

many children was involved, the Respondents had a duty to
rigorously follow the ·rule-making procedure.

Here no

reasons of any intelligible sort were given to justify this
emergency action.
Respondents thus violated §63-46-5(2) by not
stating in writing their reason~ as required by statute.

By

wrongfully deleting the stepchild assistance under an
emergency adoption procedure, Respondents denied Appellants
the right to a twenty day lapse of time before the deletion
went into effect as provided in §63-46-5(1) and the opportunity to participate in rule making as provided in UCA
§63-46-5 (1) (b).
§63-46-5 (5) provides that ,. [n] o rule hereafter
adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance
with this section."

Courts have held that rules not promul-

gated in compliance with State administrative procedure acts
are void.

See, e.g. Adams v. Professional Practices Commission,

524 P.2d 932, 933 (Okla. 1974).
In a case similar to the present case, Burke v.
Children's

$~rvice

Division, 26 Or. App. 145, 552 P.2d 592

-·· 1'

(Ct. App. 1976), the court held that the Oregon Children's
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Services Division (CSD) had violated the rule-making provisions of the Oregon Administrative Procedures Pct by
issuing a rule terminating the program of direct child care
payments without giving Plaintiff and others similarly
situated proper notice and
to be heard by CSD
, an opportunity
-

,.

before the program was terminated.

The Court held that the

rule was ineffective and the program could not be deleted
until proper rulemaking procedures were followed.
Courts in

cofi~truing

similar notice requirements in the

federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
reached the same conclusion.

§553, have

One of the earliest of these

cases is Hatch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280
1954).

Federal

(9th Cir.

The Court stated unequivocally that the procedural

provisions established for administrative agencies are an
inherent part of legislative delegation of authority.
the words of that court,

In

"Unless the prescribed procedures
",;

are complied with, the agency (or administrative) rule has
not been legally issued, and consequently it is ineffective."
Id. at 283.
In'a more recent case, Kelly v. United States, 339
F. Supp. 1095

.

(E.D. Cal. 1972), involving the sale of Indian

lands by the ,..,.Interior Department, the court addressed the
issue of whether regulations issued in violation of the

-30Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APA's notice requirement are valid.

~he

Interior Department

there invoked the "good cause" exception allowing notice to
be dispensed with if compliance is

impracticabl~,

sary, or contrary to the public interest.

unneces-

The reasons for

non-compliance must be indicated for the notice requirement
to be validly avoided.
5 (2).

This is also required by UCA §63-46-

Because this requirement was not

com~lied

court reaffirmed the holding of Hatch that,

with, the

"administrative

regulations are void unless published in strict conformity
with the Administrative Procedure P.ct."

Id. at 1101.

The

Court accordingly found the regulations authorizing the land
sale to have been illegally authorized and granted Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue.

See also City of

New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 516

(E.D.N.Y. 1974)

and cases cited therein.
The cases cited above are clear in indicating that
strict compliance with procedural rules is necessary for the
valid enactment of rules by administrative agencies.

Any

rule promulgated without such compliance is strictly an
ultra vires act having no legal significance.

Respondents

here have adopted a rule in violation of the Utah Administrative Rul~;making Act.

The rule deleting the Stepchild

Assistance Program must be held void until proper procedures
are followed.
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CONCLUSION
Aooellants
have demonstrated that Respondents have
J:
J..

improperly and unlawfully deprived some 1,850 families in
Utah of welfare benefits to which they are entitled under
federal law and regulations.

Respondents are bound to

follow these regulations and have not done so.

Procedurally,

Respondents have terminated these benefits without adequate
notice to the affected families, both in the terms of the
May 10, 1979 notice which virtually precluded requests for
hearings and decided a priori that no hearings were necessary,
and in

Res~ondents'

non-compliance with the Utah Administra-

tive Rule-making Act.

Appellants' children are dependent,

needy, are eligible and are being denied AFDC benefits
improperly.
The constitutionality of S.B. 54 is not at issue
in this lawsuit but RespondEnts'purported application of it
is.

The Legislature can pass a bill such as S.B. 54 but the

bill does not require and federal law does not allow Respondent
to reshape long established federal definitions of eligibility
for AFDC benefits.

This Court should adopt the well-reasoned

views of HEl\7 and hold that Appellants are eligible for AFDC
benefits un~r federal law, since there is no state law of
general applicability which requires stepparents to support
stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adootive
.c
parents must support their children.
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Appellants request this Court declare Respondents'
actions violative of State and Federal statutes and regu-·
lations and enjoin Respondents from continuing ·these illegal
actions.

Appellants and the class they represent should be

awarded AFDC benefits from the time they were improperly
terminated.

The decision below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this

_ _.__'M_~---'

tL

J-{ -day

of

1980.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered two copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Paul M. Tinker and
Sharon Peacock, Assistant Attorneys General, State Capitol

-~ _ jj_ d.. ay o f

Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this ;);
.March, 1980 ......
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FA-1-6

JUN 8 i979

i\.nt~ony

Dr.

:·;. :-!itc:H:ll
Director
D2~;~~rt.s~r.t. of Scci2l ~,ervic·~s
151 \·;est : .. ort·:1 T~-::~:-::lc
Salt L::.ke City, Utan
8-1103
~~ccutivc

Dear Dr. Mitchell:
is t.o fc!'..·~211 y ~H::vi.s2 Y·::IU t:::l.t t"::~ rrop·:':S 17'::.~ 2.T'.":-.:~r-:(b':!nt
to the Utz~ h t i t 1 c I ~1.- ,\ :: t;::, t £! D l an, f! n t it 1 c d " D2:; riv a t ion o f
St::-·r-ort in p_,2l<1tior. to thf! St~-:-::·r2re:1t 11 , tr<J.n::>~i ttcd !:ly
PC0-11 #73-10, is not approva~le.

T!-.i~

As you arc 2.-...·arc, bec2usc of the nature of t11e plcn arr.endn:cn t, \-,'c ref<:~r:rG'd this Ma teric:! l to our .Rcc;io!"l; l . ~. ttorr.ey
for revic::.4 ~r.·-3 cc;:;~cnt::i.
i...::::-,o!; ot1r rer:ucst, t1:is rr.:ittcr ·~as
givc!1 a "priority'' st~tus to c:n<J~lc u:; to r:--.c~:e a ti::.c:ly
re3fO?~s~ to you.
;\s t'!lc R~r;ion2l .~.ttorr:'::y 1 s of ficc h:i.:
.cl.t:"ec.dy cor:sid.:.~r~c tf'.i!:.-: i:=:;.::::~.:e s:::v;:~re.l ti::-.0s in t~c pc.st t\..ro
ye.2r:~, t~1cir <1tte:ntior: t::i.s ti;..;; ·,,·:i;:; c'!5rect':.:d tc·.;2rd dcb:~r
P1inir:q ', .:!i~t~~or t~-:c Dc;~.artr::cr.t 1~ ::oJ. icy, t:-1::~ o[ follo•.liwJ
t~:·; ' 1 triT.".21rtit0 tr:st 11 set fort·:; 't)'~· t;,c 1.J. S. S\.::;:.c-·?.:o;c Cot:rt
ir: Lr:'"~.._~~ vs. r·'.:!!:"t.:ti;/ :::.7 u. s. 5)7. (107')) I h~J ~)2(::D !1:0~.:Ji~i'2d.
~ y t ~>-:: C() r. t c n t o f the ck c i s i on c i: t ~-: 2 U • s. • Co '...n- t o f ~\ :-'· ;., c:: ~ l s
in Arcr.~h.1.ld vs. ~:h;:i.J.71::0, 555 F.2d l:').Sl (1st Cir. l'.}7'7).
We have now been c.dvis.::d t~iat althou~;!1 tl'-;e '!>:r3..:.t'.:.ent is
c::msidr:rin0 ~";1;~tr~er t1--.cir i:-olicy ;-:.2rt2i Tli::r:r to th~; tr-e ..~t~ent
of steo:x-:ir;nts under ti tlc. IV-J.. of U:~ ~~c.cL:.l Sr..!curi ty .i\ct
0
Sh '"'l.11'"1 ,~
•J.,,..
.6

_./

'-A

F'Q,.:i.:.:.i.-..:i
'"~
. . _ • .J...J ... ..1,.\...,;;.L!,

l·,.....
•"

li'rr-..,t
':~L'

O'_..

t->)n
-·' ....

:\rc.._~.;l-.:-:>l:-1
_:__·---'-·--'_
..::__:.._·--·-

r~t-·ci:-ior.,
_,. .. _
~-

'I

unlPSS
-

a -:":·.?els ion to c112 :ir;8 the nresr.n t -:;0 Ji C':' i ~; : ·.::<'. e, "'-~ i c:: ~2 s
not yet occurrAJ, t1:~ Dc?.Jrtr:;(?~t is still follo'.·:iriq ti1e
11
''tri~2rtit8 tcst.

As you will rcc~ll fron our corrcs?ona~~cc to you eatc~
Sept 8 '."7",::: c r 2 ~ , l <)7 7 , u r: ,_: P- r t h i. s · t r i 1:.;;. rt i t c t cs t
t '.i e s u fl port
obli~ation of the stcp~arent 2ust b~:
11

11

,
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1.

a duty of general ·applicability;

2.

one in which he could be com~cllec1 by court order
to fulfill even after he has deserted or a~andoned
the household; and

3.

which·~ust exist regardless of whether the
chilr~rcn would otherwis(~ rccei ve A'FDC :-:·a r,.!:"!nts.

one

~:e b::!s~

our decision not to a")prove t~is title IV-1-. ;.>lan
a1-aend~:1ant on objections to t~~- £ollowir.g parts of the 11 Utah
Sup?ort of Stepchildren'' law:
Section 2. Section 72-45-4.li

Tho second !13.rt.of the "trip<lrtite testtt refer-red to is
interpreted c.s :;ermittir.q a St3tc to consieler 2. stc!.Jro.rent
pZJrent 11 fnr l-.FI:'C r:urr--oses only wi1cr: he is cercrnor.ially
~arried to the child's natural or ad0ntive p~r0nt, and Gtatc
l;;·,.· icposes a su.:)port o::,ligeltion on th~ ster:,2r·-~nt that is
coextensive with that i~~os9d on a naturnl or a2ootive narent.
Federal r-..')licy has been th<1t in order for a ste;i:rarent to be
co~sicered to be leqally obli~ated to sup?ort his stepchildren "to the sa~e extent that ~atural or adoptive parents are
re(}uired to support. th~ir c=-:ih~r.zn, 11 it is necessary th2.t
the ste~parent•s liability e~tc~d for the ~uration of the
rnarria0c which creates the stery-relatio~shi~. so thnt if
the ster-·~3.rent abandon·s the fz-:~ilv er is ot~~crwise absent, he
....
/:'~ ... i' "".- - 1" 1' o;,..;
. . .~l ~ ;:""r
~ 1 1n~r-i~t·
o.c t'h,.,.
a-::> . rel"]~ a
.......
.-11;.J
""·-..
.:-..
1 .. ::._ ~ :.~
..., t ~ . . ._,. c,11· ] ·lrr·n
'.;_
r.::;tural pc.rent.
Th?. vt2:1 lm·: st?.te:=;, ~s to tr!~ step~arent:~,
however, that ''in cases where there is a fll?d pending aivorce
action ·,!i th senaration or ir~ cases where there is a leer Al
s·:;r.aration 'bet~·!een the .ste!:)'.:""--2\r0nt and the chiJ -3 •s nn.tu~al
parent, the sup~ort obligation shall be as if the ~artiaqe had
never ta~en olace." 3ection 30-4-3 of the Utah Cece i\.nnotated
provides, with rcs:r-ect to th8 power. of a Court to order a
natural or adontive parent to sup~ort his childran when the
parents arc legally sep3rated, that ~ • • • the court ~ay
decree (to the wife) money for her su~~ort a~d th2 support of
minor children • • • • "
Further, section 3•1-3-S of the Utah
Code Annotc.ted wrovides that ~.!t-!H?n .a <]~_cr·~c of C!ivorce is
entered, the Co~rt ~3Y ;ake sudh ~raers in rel~tion to the
muir.te!'1ancc of the oarties and th-8 diilclren as :-ra·:" be er:uitable;
ana s<!ction 78-45a-i provi:1es that the father of a child which
is or·may be born out of wedlock is liable to the sarre extent
a

11

,~.a

~,!."")

~

~·"

·~......

J...

~-~

~

-'·~

1

l"'i

4,

, . , _ _.
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Thr;s0 euthar:ities HOUld c.~ea:r to ir:c1icate that the obliqation
of a st(:::)r::rcnt to .'3Ur.::~o:.--t :-!is ~-~t.E::~chiJ.·] is not, und~r the
inst:int ar:~Cr.'J-~-:-,-3nts, c::czt~nzi·i..T2 \:ith tz10 oblic2tio'.;1 of a
natural or 2c:ic;,tive ~.::lrent to sun:}ort hi:3 child and th::it the
proposea State plan ~~en~ment, t~~refore, is not approvable
under the existing criteria.

Section 3. Section 78-45-4.2:
Under present D"~rartr:tcnt policy, we find this s~ction, -Khich
gives the stepp2rent th0 r.ight to recover from the n.;:itural
or adoptive parent, t~e ~2ounts expenc0d by hi~/hcr for the
support of his/h3r stepc~ild~2n, unacccptcble.
A provision

such as this is not c~n3istent with the rc0uir~~ents of
45 CFR 233.90(a) which de~anas that with r~spect to child
support liability, stepparents be treated in the same manner
as natural or adoptive parcnts,·with'no exceptions.
Ne are advising you that this policy also is un~er review by
the Department, but again, unless a a~cision to change the
present policy is rr:adc, which has not yet oacurred, the current policy zt2nds, cwusinq this section also to be reason for
reco~mending disapproval.

We will be rccorr..rnending the disupproval of this title IV-A
plan amcn_d:::ent to thr'1 Associate Cor1i1llSsio!"ler for Family
.fi.ssistance.. Upon his concurrence 'f.vi th the disap!Jroval action,
w~ will be sending you official notification of the disapproval
Once such a disar.?roval is official, should the State continue
to operate based upon the disapproved material, the withhqldir.g of all title IV-A FFP could result.
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Dr. Anthony W.

~itchell

4

We regret the inconven;i.enc'3 which ".·lill result frori:i our
decision that yocr pro~osed nlan a~ena~ent is not ao~rovable.
Although we were unable to d~velop a d~finitive sta~~e prior
to the impl€mt?.ntation date of your Su-pport of Stc::1childrcn
Act, Wt:! h3ve been able to ir..fo!T.l you of the non-arprovabj_li ty
of this 2~en~nent within the 90-~ay ti~e p~riod s~ecif icd in
· 45 CPR 201.3(e).
It is unfortunate that the lcgisl~tive
process could not have been influ~ncsd in such a way as to
be mo.re responsive to the polnts of concern He had cor.sistcntl~
raised since 1977 about similar lcqir~lction. }i.c1ditionally, i t
is ul"'~.;ays 'h~lpful on inportant iszu-~s suet as t'his to ?7.31~e
every effort to delay imnlementation (aqain throu0h apprising
the legislature of the im~act on Federal fundinq) until
regional office appraisal bf a proposed plan arnena~ent is
concluacd.
The Office of Fanily ..?:..ssistance staff stands ready to assist
you in whatever man~er you deen o.npropriate in this matter.

Please contact Ms. Leza Gooden at (303) 837-564~ for whatever
additional information or assistance you r.2.y feel necessary.
Your cooperation in this matter has been appreciated.
Sincerely,

Patricia J. Livers
J\cting P.egion.al C01:-:missioner
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-

~ 11i tche 11
r::-:ecutivc Director
~:;>2 ~t;:;c:1t of Social Services
150 :-.~cs t !'Jorth 'l:;r.:nle
Sa·l t Lu~~c City, Utoh
8410 3

Dr. l-.!1 t~D~Y \r!.

Dear Dr. Mitchell:
This corres?ondcnce officially notifies you th:lt the title
IV-;\ plan a~ench7lent subnii tted uncer PC0-11 H79-10, entitled
"r.e;n·ivation of Su;::i;;-ort ;in Ecl2tion to the Stepric:.n~nt, 11 is
cis?.IJ.:Jroved.
T~-:is actio11 is bei::0 t-?.::-en after consultation
with the :\ssociate Co:::.:::issio~c~r ;or ?c.:'"'.:ilv Assi.star.ce.
That
corisul tation re::>1.1l tcd in the cclet:i.on of ~l!r previously noted
o~jt3cticns to Section 3. Sc2tior. 78-45-4.2 of the "Utah
Sup:?ort of St,epchildren" 12·\/.
As

in:1ic~ted

in our corre0ror..d.er.ce to you dat£d June 8, 1979,

in order for a stepparent SUDport law to racet the requirements of ~5 CFa S 233.90(a), it must b2 a S~ate law of qeneral
applicability w11i ch re".:}uir~s s tcpp;.:ffer.ts· to sup'0Qrt stepchildren to the sarac extent that their !12tl:ra1 or adcpti ve r;arents
are r8q_uircd to support their childr~0.
A n~view of your
"Support of Ste9children" la·.-r (S.:-3. t~o. 54) indicates that it
does not n-2et t:1ese requirernDnts, atl.d therefor.;, the related
ti t:'.e IV-A amend.!\.ent rr.us t be disu.pproved.

The decision to disapprove this title IV-A plan amend~ent is
based on objections to the following section of the "Utah
Support of Stepchildren" law:
Section 2. Section 78-45-4:1:
"·

45 CF~ S 233.90(a) permits a State to consider a stepparent
a "parentu for AFDC purposes only w:··wn he is ceremonially
married to the child's natural or adontive pa.rent, and State
l::iw inposcs a support obligation on the stc~parent that is
coextensive with that imposed on a natural or adoptive parent.
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2

?2de.:-.:1l ::·oli·:~:'" l:.::~3 ~·:en t~2t in or:-":r:r for a stc:-:7".::.t:-cnt to
C':;:;.:::.J..:kTC»:: t.O be 10(;.:: ll \i ·:)~)lic;.:;.t2d to su::>:;0rt his
11
ste?c:;ild::-cn t8 t':le s2.-:·.2 ·:::!::tcr»t t'.-;Z\t r:2tur0l or 2do2tivt:
p:?.rents 2:-~ :-cq"..\ir~:-1 to st:::i:---·o!:"t t:;±ir c:1ilr:::r.:~!1, it is
n0c82sz.rv
t.h.J.t tr:t3 sto0~::-.:.rc'nt 1 s -1i~·">i11·
+-v
C)·.-~(•nA
for
.
._J
-··''-·-·
the C.:~ratior1 of th·::. r.~1:::-i2Jt-! ·<'!~;ich cz:-~.'}t~s. ti".? ste~relationshir~ 20 that i£ t~~ ster~2r~~t ~han~o~s the
fa::lily or is otho~vise c:i'::-)sent:, h~ rc111air. s li2':::-le for
suppo::-t of t1-:(: s t·~;,chilc rcn, 2.S ·.D~J h~ a n2t~.!ra 1 02re.nt.
- • • ~=>- t ~ \...~.....,),
~
t o t. •n~ ~ t-~r.;~::ir~!1 '-~s, 'n·::>~lt~-:...r2r,
.
T h. . ,c.; T\..) l.<- h' i ~~·,..,.
that "in c~.1se:s Hh:.?re ttcre is a fiL~.d ''J2n:Jir:11 a.i":t~rc.~
action ~.vith s::'!;-.,2rat.ion· or in cas0r3 \·;};ere tlv:?re is a lec;Zll
scparatio!1 bc~b.reen the s tepparc~t and th8 c~ilc1.' s natural
parent, th8 sup?or~ obliqation shall be as if the ~arriage
; had n~~vcr ta~t:en pL.1c<~. 11 S~ctio:1 30-·~-3 of t'::e Utah Code
Annotated proviocs, wi t'h resp~ct to the po·.v-er of a
b-~

-~

'.'.">

'!' ·'- ....,

t...i.

Court to

ord~r

L..

,..

-~-

""" ,..

"-"'·"-'

a nc.tural or adontive

~arcr.t

to sur.icort

his chilcren \.t~en th'2, :rarcnts c~e lcc;zl1y scparat·~d. that
"
• th~ court r1:.~y r1-3cr~e (to t'h-? ~1i f·~) r.:on~y for her
support and thn supp0rt o= r:!ir.or children. • •
t• Furt'her,

Section 30-3-5 of the Utah

~rhen
:r, •• •

d-

1 ncre('>

•
U--·

_

~-

o+=

'·'-

r1-i
"'O~c-::.
_ _..."
't.,.

i~·
.:,

such orcers in relation to

parties and the

chilar~n

as

C~1e Annotat~d ~rovides
r.nJc<".';~·::"lo,:J
t'-""
C-o,,-.i.
.....
':"I~,
--s..
'-""J..1: .. , •.:. 1
&t-:.,
"-\A.~"...
'~'U,t

t1:t~ r~2int'2~ance of
~ay b~ e~uita~le;

t~at
r",.·,:::l.,,
'- ...:n
... i....:.

the

and ·

section 73-45a-1 rrovic·~5 that· the f,:.th-er of a child which
is or may be born out of 'wedlock is li~ble to the same
extent as t~.:! fat:-ier of a c!lild born in ~..1edloc"'.<.. J._'l'\d,
in R·~Dv~s vs. R~cvQ.:?_, 556 fl· 2d 1267 (Utu.h l'J7G), the
Uta~1 Supreme Court, ci ti r.ry SS 7 2-45- 3 c:nn ·1 of t1;-:; Utc.h
Code l'\nnotatcd, held that "the c~1ildren nrc uncon.:ii tionally
entitled to suyport fro~ their par~nts; and the State is
authorized by law and shoul1 be oncouraqed and aided as
a nutt~r of r;ublic policy to s0e t!lat t:"1at responsibility
is borne by then both initially and in any necessary
subsequen.t proceedings.

11

Th9.se authoritj.cs would ?.ppear to indicate that the obliqu.tion of a stepparent to SU?~ort his stepchild is not, unaer
the instant ar.;end::-.ents, coextensive with the obligation of
a natural or adoptive parent to support his child and that

the ~roposed State plan amend~ent, therefore, is not
approvuble under the existing criteria.
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U9on rcceirt of this cor~eS?O~d~nce, you have been offici2lly notified of th~ dis~~?~ov~l of the title IV-A 9lan
a~·2!1'~:-:?cr:t sub::-.i tt0 1 ~ un-=:0r 'FCJ-11 ;~79-10.
~;e 'hcJ.V2 t'r.erefore
enclos(;(] your co~;i~:J of ?OJ-11 #79-10, which have been
w.r..n0t:i.t-;d to ir..r.~ic-ut0 c1L,:::ip')rov.:!l. Shoulcl t:~-~ .St~,te
c;.:>nt.ir:ue to (l-;JSr:.t~ :i:ts ·titlr;; T.\'-A :;::rot":r~:-:i i~ 2ccord2nce
with tr:is r3i02~Tro,i2d. n2t':'!rial, a forF~ul cor.0U.anc,~ issu~
will be r2ised, which could result ·1n the ~1~hholdinq of
all title IV-A funds.

You have t:·w riq~1t to 11ave this decision to disaDprovc
reconsi6r::r··:=d by th.e D~ruty Co:-;:rds:;i.oner of SccLnl Security,
under Section 1116 of tho Social Security Act, within
60 cays after this notification.
Sinccrely1

Patricia J. Livers
.Z\cting Regional Cor:1l:dssioner

Enclosures
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LOREN

SUP PO in' OF STEPCli I

1900

BUDGET SESSION
Enrolled Copy

s. a. No. 6
AN

ACT

RELATING

TO

THE

DUTY

By

K. S. Cornaby

OF

STEPPARENTS

TO

SUPPORT

STEPCHILDREN; DELETING LANGUAGE ALLOWING A CESSATION Of

A

STEPPARENT'S DUTY TO SUPPORT STEPCHILDREN DURING A PENDING

DIVORCE ACTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION; AND DEFINING

THE

TERM

"STEPPARENT."
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION

78-45-4.

ENACTED

BY CHAPTER 131,

45b-2,

UTAH

CHAPTER 131,

Scct1on

l,

UTAH CODE ANNOTP.TED 1953,

LArJS OF UTt\!-l 1979,

ANNOTATED

CODE
LAWS OF

1953,

as enacted by Chapter 131,

AS

SECTION

78-

LAST AMEIIDED BY

UTAH 1979.

Section 78-45-4.1,

1.

AND

AS

Utah Code Annotated 1953,

Laws of Utah

is

1979,

amended

to

read:

A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the

78-15-1. 1.

ox tent Lhnt n natural oi· udoptive parent

tH1rnc

cupport

a child.

P1·ovicled,

of

marriage

or

the

common

however,

law

ie

rcqu1 rod

thnt upon the

tennination

between

relationship

to

the

stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive pnrent[**,*or*in

cases*whcre*there**is**a**filed**pending**divorce**action**with
separation*or*a*legal*separation*between*the*stepparent*and*the

child's*natural*parcnt,**) the support obligation

shall

{**be

as*if*the•marriage"had*never•taken*place**l ~er~ate.
Section 2.

Section 70-45b-2,

last amended by Chapter 131,

Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

Laws of Utah 1979,

is

amended

to

read:
7 8 - '1 Sb - 2 .

As u s e d

i n

th i s ch a p t e r· :
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6
"Department"

( l)

means

the

state

department

of

social services.
"Dependent

( 2)

age ofl8 who is not
married,

child"

means

otherwise

any

person

emancipated,

under

the

self-supporting,

or a member of the armed forces of the United States.
11

(J)

"Court

order"

means

district court of this state or
of .~nether

jurisdiction

any
of

·~tate

judgment or order o! any
any

court

ordering

of

comparable

payment of a set or

determinable amount of support money.
"Support

(4)

debt"

means the debt created by nonpayment

of child support under the laws of this state or
of

any

court

of

appropriate

the

decree

jurisdiction ordering a sum to

be paid as child support.
"Need"

( 5)

clothing,
of

the ·,

means

shelter

and

medical

necessary

costs

attendance

for

of

the

food,
support

any dependent child.
"Disposable earnings 11 means that part of the earnings

( 6)

of any

individual

remaining

after

the

deduction

from

those earnings of any amount required by law to be withheld.
"Assistance"

( 7)

means

any

assistance

any

natural

for

aid to

families with dependent children.
( 8)

"Person"

corporation,
(9)

"Responsible

(10)

parent"

means

services,
bonus,

mean

whether
or

compens~tion

denominated

otherwise,

and

periodic payment pursuant to pension
or insurance policies of any type.
include all gain derived from
combined,

the

firm,

department.

natural

parent,

or stepparent of a dependent child.

"Earnings"

commission,

person,

association, political subdivision or

adoptive parent,

personal

includes

or

paid or payable for
as

wages,

specifically
retirement

salary,
include
programs,

Earnings shall specifically

capi~al,

from labor. or from both

including profit gained through sale or conversion of

capital assets.
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S. B. No. 6
(11)
a

"Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to

child's natural or adoptive parent who

natural

or

adoptive

adoptive parent as
marriage

was

a

entered

is

not

the

child's

parent or one living with the natural or
common
into

law
in

soouse,
a

whose

common

law

state which recognizes the

validity of common law marriage.
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IN THE UNITED. ST:\TES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
\

MARGAfl.ETTE CURTIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

TCA 78-732.

RECEIVED

WILLIAM J. PACE, JR.,

individually and as Secretary

ORDER

'JUL l 0 1978

of the State of Florida De-

partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services,

NATJOUAl ClE,\RJ)IGHOUSE
FOR lEGAl .mv1m

Defendants.

This case is before the court for consideration of
numerous motions.

Heuring on plaintiffs' motions for pre-

liminary injunctive relief and for partial swrunary judgment was held on April 5, 1978.

At th~ hearing the court

:11ade the following rulings on other pending motions:

(1)

defendant's motion to dismiss and .motion to dismiss the
first amended complaint shall be denied, since abstention
is inappropriate under the circumstances of this case and
exhaustion of state remedies is not generally a bar to an

action for relief brought under 42 U.S.C. 51983, Gibson

J,\....

v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 11973); (2) defendant's motions
to take judicial notice of state court proceedings and

state adjudicatory administrative proceedings shall be

___ __,.,..granted; and

(J)

plaintiffs' motion to strike shall b~

denied.
Additionally, the court has. carefully considered

plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, and is of the
opinion that this case should proceed as a class action
pursuant to Rule 23 (a)

&

(b) (2), Federal Rules of Civil

1373 APn IJ

P~

3: 50

FILED
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procedure.

\

Plaintiffs' motion to continue preliminary in\ \
'\

"

junction and for partial summary judgment are based upon
the same legal contention -- that the notice issued by
defendant dated October 20, 1977, is "inadequate» within the meaning of 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a} (4).

That regula-

tion provides:
(4)

In cases of intended action to

discontinue,

te~minate,

suspend or

reduce~

assistance:
(i)

The State or local agency shall

give timely and

adeq~ate

notice . . •

Where;the intended action is the result of a change in state
law requiring automatic grant adjustment, as it is in
the present case, the required notice is considered "adequate" if
it includes a statement of the intended
action, the reasons for such intended
action, a statement of the specific
change in law requiring such action and
a statement of the circumstances under
which a hearing may be obtained and assistance continued.
45 C.F.R. 5205.lO(a) (4) {iii).
Th~

October 21, 1977, notice mailed by defendant to

'

the class of Medicaid recipients represented by plaintiffs
falls short of the "adequate notice" requirement in two
respects.

First, the notice provides no statement of the

specific change in law which required the changes in
Medicaid benefits.
Second, the notice gives an insufficient "statement
of the circumstances under which a hearing may be obtained

-2-
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\

and assistance continued."

The right to a hearing and

_r'\

continuation of benefits is specified in 45 C.F.R.

\ \'\,

§205 .10 (a) (6):

(

( 6)

if the recipient requests a hearing
within the timely notice period:
(i)
Assistance shall not be suspended, reduced, discontinued or
terminated . . . until a decision
is rendered after a hearing, unless:
(A) a determination is made at
t.he hearing that the sole issue isone

of State or Federal law or policy, or
change in State or ~ederal law and
not one of incorrect grant computation.
(emphasis added).

These regulations entitle recipients of benefits to a
hearinq and the continuation,of benefits pending the hearing.

Benefits may be terminated only when it is determined

"at the hearing" that the only issue is one involving a
change in state or federal law.

The October 2l, 1977,

notice wholly fails to apprise affected recipients of
the·ir rights under §205 .10 (a) (6), and therefore cannot be
considered ·"adequate" within the contemi?lation of §205.10
(a) (4) (iii).

Becker

1977); Turner v.

v.

~,

Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.
435 F. Supp. 707 (W. D. Mo. 1977).

Accordingly, since defendant's notice does not con-

lo rm to the requirements

o:

lz.v. and there are

:10

disput~d

issues of material fact, plaintiffs are entitled to summary

judgment on Count I enjoining defendant from enforcing
the changes in Medicaid benefits indicated'in the notice
dated October 21, 1977, until defendant provides adequate

notice as required b:( 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4)
{'

(i)

&

(iii).

The motion for continuance of preliminary injunction is
rendered moot by the disposition of plaintiffs' swnmary
judgment motion, and it shall conse9uently be denied.
The final motion that is presently pending is plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction pursuant to

-3-
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plaintiffs' amended supplemental complaint.

\

This motion

i

\. '·'

raises the issue whether defendant's notice of March 1,
.\

\'

1978, regarding implementation of a $.50 co-payment for
prescription drugs is

"~dequate."

There are four general prerequisites for a preliminary injunction:
(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff

will prevail on the merits,

(2) a substantial

threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable

injury if the injunction is not granted,
(3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff
outweighs the threatened harm the injunction
~ay

do to defendant, and (4) that granting

the preliminary injunction will not disserve

the public interest.
Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489
F. 2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).

In the case at bar~ the

court finds that all four of the above requirements are
satisfied.
Plaintiffs have plainly demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this action, because

the notice mailed March 1, 1978 is "inadequate."
notice states, "If you

beli~ve

The

that this agency action

constitutes an individual incorrect grant computation,
you may appeal this action and request a hearing." As
written, the notice improperly attempts to.restrict the class
of persons who may request a hearing to those who claim
an incorrect grant

computati~n.

As discussed above, 45 C.F.R.

5205.10 contemplates that any benefit recipient can request a hearing.

It is only at the hearing that the state

agency is authorized to inquire whether the issue involves

-4-
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~~ate

or federal law or policy and not an incorrect g~ant

computation.

\
\~\
\

\

45 C.F.R. S205.lO(a) (6).

Defendant's notice

does not apprise the entire class of Medicaid recipients
of their entitlement to a hearing, and consequently does
not pass muster under the federal regulations. 1

For two reasons, there is also a substantial threat
that plaintiffs and the class they represent will suffer
irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not
granted.

First, this court cannot under the E1eventh

Amendment order retroactive payment by the State of Florida
of unlawfully withheld Medicaid benefits.

See Edelman

v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Mathias v. City of Milwaukee Dep't. of City Development, 377 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.
Wis •.:. 1974).

Second, plaintiffs' affidavits demonstrate the
drastic effects that implementation of the co-payment proposal will have on their finances and health.

"The in-

jury to those whose health is maintained on the slenderest chemical balance provided through medication is not

merely irreparable, it is ultimate."

Becker v. Toia,

supra, at 336, quoting Bass v, Richardson, 388 F. Supp.
478, 489 (S. D. N.Y.

1971).

This injury is especially

significant in the case of those class members who are
confined in nursing homes, for they are limited to a
monthly income of $25.00 for all personal needs excepting
nursing home care.

The co-payment would significantly

reduce these persons' already meager resou~ces.
The remaining two requirements of the Canal Authority
test demand little discusion.

The threatened injury to

plaintiffs outweighs any detriment to the State of Florida
that may be occasioned by the grant of a preliminary injunction.

The fiscal burdens faced, by Florida as a result

of inadequate budgeting do not loom large in comparison

-5-
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to the direct, deleterious consequences to plaintiffs

if an injunction is not ordered.

1

'\\

Florida is

posse~sed

of alternative means of obtaining needed funds to avoid

\

a budget

defic~t.

Moreover, even

as~uming

that the

injury to defe~dant resulting from grant of an injunction
will be substantial, the balance of the equities favo~s
1

the party who is most likely to prevail on the merits -in this case, the plaintiffs.
The public interest will be served by granting the

requested preliminary injunction because injunctive relief
will vindicate and protect the procedural rights belonging
to plaintiffs under federal law.
~In

accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

Defendant's motion to dismiss filed October 31,

1977, is DENIED.

2.

Defendant's motion to dismiss the first amended

complaint is DENIED.
J.
'\

[,

Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class is GRANTED.

The ~lass shall consist of all Medicaid recipients in the
State of Florida.

Within this class shall be three dis-

tinct subclasses:

(a)

~11

Medicaid recipients in the State of
I

Florida residing in nursing homes.

' ,
l

(b)

All Medicaid recipients in the State

o~

Florida who are under the age of 21 and are eligible for
Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT)
services.
(c)

All Medicaid recipients in the State of

Florida who require more than three physician visits per
month.
4.

Defendant's motion to take judicial notice of

-6-
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state court proceedings is GRANTED.
5.

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment

as to Count I is GRANTED.

Defendant is hereby permanently

enjoined from enforcing the reductions in Medicaid benefits effective November 1, 1977, until defendant provides
adequate notice of the reductions in compliance with
45 C.F.R. S205.10(a) {4) (iii) to plaintiffs and the members
of the class they represent.
enter

a final

The clerk of the court shall

judgment as tQ Count I declaring that the

notice of reduction of Medicaid benefits issued by defendant on October 21, 1977, is inadequate as a matter
of l<\w, 45 C.F.R. §205.10 (a) (4) (iii), and that the reduction in benefits effective November 1, 1977, is also
invalid as a consequence of the provision of inadequate
notice.
6.

Plaintiffs' motion to continue preliminary in-

junction is DENIED as moot.
7.
sta~~

Defendant's motion to take judicial notice of

adjudicatory administrative proceeding is GRANTED.
8.

Plaintiffs' motion to strike is DENIED.

9.

Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction

pu .•:sua11t to plaint::f fs' ar.1en<led St.lpplemental com?lu.int is
GRl\.NTED.

Pending final disposition of this action, de-

fendant is hereby enjoined from requiring plaintiffs and

the class they represent to pay a $.SO co-payment for.
·each prescription covered by Medicaid unless and until
adequate notice in compliance with 45 C.F.R. §205.10 is
provided to plaintiffs and the class.
DONE J\ND ORDERED this

/...3~ay

/.J.

..

of April, 197 8.

,/~

?/(/
~.-:J..;>.....K., . .,__,, _, _"'_,.~"'r'--WILLIN-1 STP"fORD
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
FOOTNOTE

FOLLO\-JS

-7--
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\

·FOOTNOTE:
\

\

' \ ,,

l.

(Curtis v. Page - TCA 78-732)

At the court's request, counsel for plaintiffs has

\

prepared a proposed notice to the class of Medicaid recipients which plaintiffs contend will be in compliance

with federal regulations.

Having reviewed this docwnent,

copi~s.of which have been provided to defendant's counsel,

the court concurs that the proposed notice would satisfy
the requirements of 45 C.F.R. §205.10.

Use of plaintiffs'

proposed notice by defendant as a model for notice to the
class would obviate further protracted litigation·on the
·adequacy of notice.

The clerk of the court is directed

to f il~ and docket in the court record the letter from
plaintiffs' counsel to which the proposed notice is attached.
The court wishes to emphasize that, in finding the
March 1,1978 notice inadequate, no fault or bad faith on
the part of defendant is implied.

As is all too common

with federal administrative regulations, 45 C.F.R. §205.10
is f gir from free of ambiguity and contradiction.

It is

apparent from a reading of the Harch 1, 1978 notice, and
the court so finds, that defendant has made a good faith
effort to comply with the requirements of 45 C.F.R. 5205.10.

-8-
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IN THE UNITED SfATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

GLORIA CAMPOS,

et al. ,

Plaintiffs

ORDER .

and

Civil No.

C 79 0278

Intervening Plaintiffs,
vs.
ANTHONY MITCHELL, et al. ,
Defendants.
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Def endan ts' cross .Motion for
Surrunary Judgment and the Memoranda in suppo rt thereof and
in opposition thereto filed by the respective parties,
and it appearing to the Court that there exist no genuine
issues of material fact as to the claims raised by Plaintiffs'
Motion:
IT
1.

rs

HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

(a)

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Sununary

Judgment is partially granted, and Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied, insofar as federal Medicaid
regulations 42 C.F.R. §431.12 and 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4)
required Defendants to consult with and allow the participation
of a properly constituted State Me dical Care Advisory Committee
in the development of policy changes in the Utah Medicaid
plan and to adequately noti f· : Medicaid recipients of intended
reductions and terminations in services, including their
rights to requ es t a hearing and the circumstances under which
services are continued and under which a hearing will be
granted.
(b)

Hearings granted pursuant to this Order

need only consider whether an individual's medical need
is covered by the Utah Medicaid program.

APPENDIX 5

Hearings need
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,t

c.·

be granted to review the wisdom or propriety of

.eductions or terminations in the program's optional services.
2.

Prior to continuing the reductions and terminations

.ffective March 1, 1979, Defendants shall forthwith:
(a)

Give a properly constituted State Medical

:are Advisory Conuni ttee a meaningful opportunity to consid e r

.ind conunent on the reductions and tcrmina tions;

(b)

Give proper notice in the form attached hereto

and incorporated herein by reference to all members of the
Haintiff class, by first class mail, of the reductions and
terminations;
(c)

Advise recipients of all services that have

been restored in accordance with the budget approved by
the 1980 Utah Legislature; and
(d)

Further advise the Plaintiff class that,

if they can show with documentation that they were billed for
services reduced or terminated from March 1, 1979, until
this subsequent notice, they may file a claim for reimbursement
with the Division of Hea l th Care Financing and Standards.
Defendants shall determine eligible claims and pay them
~

the extent they can make funds available.

3.

The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the

issue of attorneys' fees and costs until further Order.
DATED this

ID

day of

~ 1980.

COPIES MAILED TO COUNSEL
Anproved as to form
and content:

BRUCE JENKI S
UNITED STA S D

TRICT JUDGE

./);,__,,_vj.. '-A-lJ1u.:iL
MARY HOWARTH
Attorney for Defendants

~~-L / ,,f)re;t/;~;:i!;-l~HN

!1c.ALLISTER

((/\ttorney for Defendants

U7AH LE AL SERVICES, INC.
By LUCY BILLINGS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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NO'I'ICE
TO ALL MEDICAID RECIPIENTS
As Medicaid recipients were notified last year, as

of !iarch 1, 1979, some s p ecific services in the Medicaid
program were reduced, and some were eliminated.

1.f}_,

On March

1980, the United States District Court for the District

of Utah ordered the Utah Department of Health to provide you
this more adequate and updated notice of program changes.
YOU MAY BE ELIGIBLE F.QR PAYMENT OF YOUR MEDICAL BILLS .

Because the notice ?rovided last year may have
been inadequate, if you were billed yo urself for the period
from March 1, 197 9 , un til you rec eive this notice, for any
of the services under lined in this notice, you may be able
to have them paid for, if money i s ava ilable.

Yo u will hav e

to prove your claim, with a cancelled check, doctor's statement,
or other means. If you believe you may be e ntitl ed to reimbursement, call the Medicaid office at 533-6571 or, if you
are outside Salt Lake County, call 1-800-662-9651 by October l, 198 0 .
T~e

Medicaid office will process such claims

like a hearing request.

Payments wi 11 be made only if ( 1)

the claim is found to be one that would have been paid i f
no cutbacks had been made, and (2) mo n e y can be made available
from state and.for federal sources to pay such cl a ims.
7~ese

services were reduced or e liminated effective

starting March 1, 1979, but were restored effective Febru a r y
4, 1980, as follows:
(1)

DENTAL CARE -

Dentures will be cove r ed .
Othe r critical den tal needs wi l l b e c o vere d i f
funding permits .
All de n tal care fo r c hi l dr e n u nder 21 has a lwa y s
been covered.

(2)

EYEGLASSES -

These will be covered.
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These servic es were reduced or eliminated effective
starting ?1arch 1, 1979, and remain as follows:
(1)

DRUGS -

You may be pr ov ided a different brand or different
looking product , but it will be the same medication.
(2)

CHIROPRA.CTORS' AN D NATUROPATHS' SERVICES -

Services prov i ded by chi r opracto rs and naturop at hs
are not covered.
However, if you rec eiv e such se rvic Gs fr om a
ohysician they are c ov ered.
(3)

PSYCHOLOGISTS'

SERVICES -

For more than 3 tr eatments to be covered, nrior
approval is required.

If a service requires prior approval this means yo ur medical

care provider must contact the Medicaid office f or a determination
of whet:-ier the benefit you s eek wi 11 be covered.

If your provider

does not reauest orior aporoval, you may call the Medicaid

office at 533-6571 or 1-800-662-9651 at any time.

If the request

is modified or rejected, you have the right to written
notice, within 30 davs after the requ est , of the action, the reasons,
and vour right to a hearing.
( 4)

':'RAHSPORTATION -

BUS trans porta tion to obtain needed med ical care
is covered by :ores e nting a TJT.A. ID Card, which is
ava ilabl e upon requ e st from your local Ass i stance
Payments office.
TAXI, rurnuCAR, or SERVICAR t r ansportation is covered for
~andicapped pe rsons who re ceive a sp ec ial transportation
card throu gh a re ques t for orio r aoor ov al as outlined
above .
MIBULANCE transportation rlue to an emergency
is not limited.

If you are not handicapped, but need Sl'.)ecial transportation (other
~~ambulance transportation du e to an emergency), you must r eque st
orior aDproval yourself bv calling the !1edicaid o ffic e .
Contrary to the notice provided in February, 1979,

the following services were not reduced or terminated:
(1)

ELECTIVE PROCEDURES

( 2)

1WRS ING HOME BED HOLD ING

( 3)

PHYSIC.Z\L THERAPY

The reductions and eliminations of services were made according to

fan intent
1

statement a p proved by th e 1979 Utah Legislature, based

on ways to decrease

~edicaid

costs wo rked out between the Department
- 7.-
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and the Leg is la ture' s .7\ppropria tions Subcommittee on Social
Services, and published in the Appropriations P.eport 19 7 9- 8 0,
from the Office of the Le g islative Fiscal Analyst, at pag e
302'

HEARING RIGHTS
You always have the right to r e quest a hearing
on your eligibility f o r Me dicaid services, and you have the
right to continued services un ti 1 a hearing decision is
~de

if you have been receiving services that are denied.

Beyond eligibility facto .rs, a hearing will only consider
whether your individual medical need is presently covered
~

the program.

You may also call the Med icaid office if

you believe a provider has incorrectly determined that
a service you need is not covered.

In a ddition, you may

request a hearing on reimbursement for services that you
already received and you be lie v e are covered.
will not be granted, howe ver,
propriety of limitations

Hearings

to revi e w the wisdom or

in the program's optional services.

:ior will the l!edicaid office review the J)rofessional judgment
of providers not to perform particular services.
If you have any questions about anything in this
notice, call the

.~1edicaid

office at 533-6571 or 1-800-662-9651,

your attorney, or any legal services office.

Approved as

~o

form and cont.en t:
/

17?2ttt~Jk(~'
[i(j
HOW.lr'RTH

.M...l\lU

Attorney for De fend a nts

,/ J,PHN
L. hIll .!~/)

/h

/ #'/~-4-----

r:> i!,_ ___j_[_/L <.L;:;,e..fi-1 · - - - -

McALLISTER
for Defendants

(~ttorney
_,,

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By LUCY BILLINGS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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